Appendix Table 1. Do Elites Capture Targeted Programs?

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Government Transfer Programs			
	Receives Benefits		
	BLT 08	Jamkesmas	Raskin
Elite	0.006	0.029*	-0.006
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Log Consumption	-0.200***	-0.185***	-0.204***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Observations	3,985	3,996	3,996
Dependent Variable Mean	0.387	0.425	0.751
Panel B: PKH Experiment			
	Receives PKH		
	PMT	Community	Community
Elite	-0.032**	-0.042***	-0.029
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.021)
Log Consumption	-0.096***	-0.124***	-0.124***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Elite Subtreatment			-0.005
			(0.024)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.027
			(0.029)
Observations	1,863	1,936	1,936
Dependent Variable Mean	0.110	0.142	0.142

Notes: Each column shows an OLS regression of benefit receipt or benefit targeting on elite and log per capita consumption. Stratum fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors clustered at the village level are listed in parentheses. An F-test on the difference between the elite-related coefficient in Panel B, Columns (1) and (2) yields: $F(1, 393) = 0.22$ Prob > F = .6369. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Appendix Table 2. Probit Model of Benefit Receipt (Formal Elites)

VARIABLES	(1) PKH Experiment	(2) BLT 08	(3) Jamkesmas	(4) Raskin
Elite	-0.112	0.166***	0.227***	0.120**
	(0.097)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.060)
Log per capita consumption	-0.058	-0.244***	-0.352***	-0.393***
	(0.094)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.058)
PMT Score	-1.284***	-0.621***	-0.312***	-0.711***
	(0.146)	(0.081)	(0.077)	(0.087)
Log household size	0.078	-0.010	0.059	-0.399***
	(0.132)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.084)
Share of children in household	0.794***	0.401***	0.229*	0.258*
	(0.234)	(0.137)	(0.133)	(0.150)
Connected with other households	-0.021	0.002	0.025**	0.031***
	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Having family members outside the village	0.012	0.010	-0.036**	-0.015
	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Participating in religious groups	-0.254***	0.097**	-0.065	0.126**
	(0.073)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.049)
Participating in community projects	0.062	-0.073	-0.056	-0.108*
	(0.084)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.058)
Contributing money to village projects	-0.131	-0.015	-0.028	-0.153***
	(0.086)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.052)
Working hard	-0.072***	-0.059***	-0.060***	-0.011
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Friendliness	0.008	0.032**	0.047***	0.036**
	(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Total savings amount	-0.049	-0.001	-0.000	-0.002
	(0.048)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Share of savings in bank	0.017	-0.526***	-0.230***	-0.467***
	(0.180)	(0.085)	(0.077)	(0.075)
Share of debt	-0.044**	-0.008*	-0.011**	-0.013***
	(0.019)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Being ethnic minority	0.095	0.096*	0.261***	0.174***
	(0.085)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.057)
Being religious minority	0.273	-0.391**	-0.356**	-0.444***
	(0.245)	(0.172)	(0.159)	(0.153)
Household head has elementary education or less	0.137	0.258***	0.180***	0.272***
	(0.092)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.055)
Household head is a widow	0.350**	-0.007	-0.059	0.066
	(0.147)	(0.105)	(0.104)	(0.120)
Household head is disabled	0.244**	0.085	0.081	0.096
	(0.123)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.104)
Household experienced death of family member	0.110	0.082	0.201	0.310
	(0.227)	(0.149)	(0.151)	(0.192)
Household has sick family member	0.037	0.112*	0.024	-0.033
	(0.097)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.067)
Household experienced income shock	-0.085	-0.044	-0.073*	-0.016
	(0.074)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.050)
Tobacco and/or alcohol consumption	0.510***	0.152	0.285***	0.489***
	(0.155)	(0.105)	(0.100)	(0.130)
Constant	15.348***	10.664***	8.150***	15.156***
	(2.019)	(1.080)	(1.028)	(1.139)
Observations	3,992	3,981	3,992	3,992
Dependent Variable Mean	0.0601	0.388	0.425	0.751

Notes: Probit model from social welfare calculation. Each column shows a probit regression of benefit receipt on elite status, log per capita consumption, and other controls. Standard errors clustered at the village level are listed in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 3. Simulated Social Welfare Under Different Levels of Capture (All Elites)

	(1) PKH Experiment	(2) BLT 08	(3) Jamkesmas	(4) Raskin
Utility…				
Without program	-6.689	-6.689	-6.689	-6.689
With Elite on	-6.600	-6.268	-6.664	-6.471
With Elite off	-6.601	-6.266	-6.664	-6.471
Under perfect PMT-targeting	-6.550	-6.149	-6.657	-6.455
Under perfect consumption targeting	-6.354	-5.991	-6.648	-6.442
Share of possible utility gain…				
With Elite on	26.35%	60.26%	61.81%	88.24%
With Elite off	26.12%	60.50%	62.06%	88.41%
Under perfect PMT-targeting	41.37%	77.26%	78.40%	94.86%

Notes: Utility is calculated as a monotonically increasing function of log per capita consumption, $u = -(\log(x)^{-2})/2$ (note that, under this formula, all utility is defined to be negative). Simulations are created with a probit model of benefit receipt, using our baseline calculations of consumption and PMT score, and a list of covariates.

Appendix Table 4. Social Welfare Levels in PKH with Additional Counterfactual (Formal Elites)

	(1) PKH Experiment
Utility…	
Without program	-6.689
With Elite on	-6.594
With Elite off	-6.595
Under perfect PMT-targeting	-6.540
Under perfect consumption targeting	-6.333
Taking PPLS, then perfect PMT	-6.557
Share of possible utility gain…	
With Elite on	26.71%
With Elite off	26.47%
Under perfect PMT targeting	41.71%
Taking PPLS, then perfect PMT	36.99%

Notes: Utility is calculated as a monotonically increasing function of log per capita consumption, $u = -(\log(x)^{-2})/2$ (note that, under this formula, all utility is defined to be negative). Simulations are created with a probit model of benefit receipt, using our baseline calculations of consumption and PMT score, and a list of covariates.